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Abstract 
 
Minimum wage legislation is central in South African policy discourse, with both strong 
support and strong opposition.  The validity of either position depends, however, on the 
effectiveness of minimum wage enforcement.  Using detailed matching of occupational, 
sectoral and locational codes in the 2007 Labour Force Survey to the gazetted minimum 
wages, this paper presents, we believe for the first time, estimates of minimum wage 
violation in South Africa.  Our results give considerable cause for concern. Minimum 
wage violation is South Africa is disturbingly high.  We find that 45% of covered 
workers get paid wages below the legislated minimum, whilst the average depth of 
shortfall is 36% of the minimum wage.  Around this average, violation is most prevalent 
in the Security, Forestry and Farming Sectors.  We hope that the quantifications in this 
paper will provide a more solid basis for discussion of minimum wage levels and their 
enforcement in South Africa.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Minimum wage legislation is central in South African policy discourse, with both strong 
support and strong opposition.  The situation is similar in many if not most developing 
countries.  As Ronconi (2008) points out, however, it is not the lack of labour regulations 
in developing countries which is the key issue.  Indeed, most developing countries have 
an extensive web of labour regulations.  In South Africa, statutory minimum wages vary 
by occupation, sector and location, and consequently there are over 36 different wage 
minima.  Hence, it seems that the key issue here is not a lack of legislation but rather a 
lack of compliance amongst employers, due to imperfect enforcement (Basu, Chau, and 
Kanbur, 2010).  
 
How well is the minimum wage enforced in South Africa?  Despite the economic and 
political importance of the issue in the country, we do not as yet have a satisfactory 
quantified answer to the question, leaving room for anecdote and speculation.1
 
  Evidence 
on compliance levels in South Africa is perhaps limited due to the difficulty of mapping 
the statutory minima to their respective sectors, occupations, and locations.  This paper 
constitutes an attempt to undertake such an analysis for South Africa.  Our objective is to 
quantify minimum wage violation in South Africa, with an index of violation that can 
measure the level, depth and severity of violation.  Using detailed matching of 
occupational, sectoral and locational codes in the 2007 Labour Force Survey to the 
gazetted minimum wages, this paper presents, we believe for the first time, estimates of 
minimum wage violation in South Africa.  
Our results give considerable cause for concern.  Minimum wage violation is South 
Africa is disturbingly high.  We find that 45% of covered workers get paid wages below 
the legislated minimum, whilst the average depth of shortfall is 36% of the minimum 
wage.  Around this average, violation is most prevalent in the Security, Forestry and 
Farming Sectors.  We hope that the quantifications in this paper will provide a more solid 
basis for discussion of minimum wage levels and their enforcement in South Africa. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II below turns to a discussion of 
minimum wage institutions and wage data in South Africa.  Section III uses graphical and 
numerical methods to quantify violation of minimum wages in South Africa.  The final 
section, Section IV, concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 There is growing evidence of non-compliance in other developing countries.  For example, in Argentina, 
only half of the workforce receives legally mandated benefits (Ronconi, 2008).  Minimum wage non-
compliance rates in Kenya reach a disturbingly high estimate of 67 % for higher skilled occupations in 
urban areas (Andalón and Pagés, 2008).  Studies also find substantial non-compliance in other developing 
countries such as Brazil (Lemos, 2009), Trinidad and Tobago (Strobl and Walsh, 2003) and several Latin 
American countries (Maloney and Nuñez, 2003).   
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II. Minimum Wage Institutions and Data in South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the body responsible for issuing state legislation in sectors it deems 
vulnerable is the Employment Conditions Commission2 (ECC).  The ECC is a 
representative body within the Department of Labour (DoL), which was established in 
1999 in order to advise the Minister of Labour on appropriate and feasible sectoral wage 
minima, known as “Sectoral Determinations”.  The broad aim of the ECC is to protect 
vulnerable workers in the South African labour market, that is, sectors in which workers 
are likely to be exploited, or in which worker organizations and trade unions are absent, 
and where workers are not appropriately covered by bargaining councils or other wage 
regulating mechanisms (DoL, 2003).  For instance, agricultural and domestic workers 
form two of the most vulnerable groups within this context in the South African labour 
market.3
 
 
The DoL uses a team of labour inspectors whose job is to enforce compliance with these 
sectoral determinations.  Inspections in most cases are triggered by complaints by clients, 
whilst high risk sectors are identified and targeted through focused blitz inspections. 
There has been some discussion attributing regional variation in the degree of violation of 
minimum wage laws, to differences in the numbers and distribution of inspectors within 
areas, as well as the possibility of the corruption of the inspectorate deployed.  Scant and 
poor quality data in the inspectorate however, renders this a difficult set of propositions 
to investigate further.  
 
The ECC sectoral determinations set general conditions for employment such as 
minimum wages, working hours, number of leave days, and termination rules.  There are 
11 different sectoral determinations set by the ECC.  Data restrictions mean that we can 
consider only 9 of these, specifically Forestry, Agriculture, Contract Cleaning, Taxi 
Operators, Civil Engineering, Private Security, Domestic Workers, Wholesale and Retail, 
and Hospitality.4
 
  (The various sectoral minima are presented in the Appendix).  The 
wage minima are regularly updated for inflation through a formal government gazetting 
process.  Ultimately though, it is important to emphasise that within the South African 
labour market, no unitary national wage minimum exists.  
Labour market data in the post-apartheid period is primarily available from two 
nationally representative household survey series, the October Household Surveys 
(OHSs) and the Labour Force Surveys (LFSs)5
                                                 
2 The ECC was established in 1999 when it replaced the Wage Board, in accordance with the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), No 75 of 1997. 
.  The OHSs collected labour market and 
other data annually for the period between 1995 and 1999.  The OHS was replaced in 
3 A complete listing of the sectoral determinations for South Africa can be found at the website of the 
Department of Labour (DoL). Available from: http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/sectoral-
determinations/sectoral-determination. [Accessed online September 2009]. 
4 In the analysis that follows below, the sectoral determination covering learnerships was excluded due to a 
lack of information in the LFS pertaining to learners.  The sectoral determination applicable to children 
working in performance arts was also excluded since children are not classified as being part of the 
working age population (15 to 65 years) in the LFS.   
5 From 2008, the LFSs were replaced by Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFSs).  
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2000 by the LFS, which until 2007 was conducted biannually.  While desirable, 
comparisons between the OHSs and LFSs are inadvisable, since questions relating to the 
individual’s employment status changed in the cross-over from the OHS to the LFS.  
Furthermore the LFS provides a far more detailed explanation of what constitutes work, 
and therefore captures irregular and informal work activities more comprehensively than 
the OHS (Casale et al. 2004).  Given these data issues, the analysis of enforcement in the 
South African labour market below uses data from the September 2007 LFS6, the latter 
being the last September edition of the biannual LFSs7
 
.  
Sectoral minima issued are specific to the location of the workers.  In particular though, 
the Department of Labour has designated local municipalities to areas A, B, and C for the 
different sectoral determinations.  This demarcation was conducted on the basis of the 
average household income recorded in the 1996 census for the municipal area concerned.  
The three areas were as follows:  
 
A – Average income greater than R24, 000 per annum 
B – Average income between R12, 000 and R24, 000 per annum 
C – Average income less than R12, 000 per annum 
 
Generally, A areas are urban, B areas are semi-urban, and other areas (C) are rural areas. 
The wages in area A are the highest, followed by area B, while area C and other areas 
have the lowest wages.  It is important to note that the area designations A, B, and C are 
not the same across different sectoral determinations.  For example, some local 
municipalities classified as Area A for farm workers fall under Area B in the retail sector.  
In order to assign individuals to area types, it was first necessary to match the 
geographical information available in the LFS 2007 to the areas listed under the sectoral 
determinations.  For the September 2007 LFS, the local municipalities listed under the 
various sectoral determinations allowed for allocation of the workers to area A, B, C.  It 
is worth noting that, in the absence of detailed information on area of work in the LFS, it 
was necessary to assume that the area in which the individual resided was the same as 
where he/she worked.  However, the possibility that individuals work outside of the area 
in which they live renders this an imperfect measure.  
 
Finally, monthly minima published by the ECC are all based on a 45-hour work week. 
Workers working longer (or shorter) hours would therefore be paid a higher (or lower) 
wage than the published average.  Consequently, the applicable minimum wages were 
adjusted according to the hours worked by each individual.  Specifically, we derive an 
adjusted minimum wage ( maw ) as the product of the stipulated minimum wage (
mw ) and 
the individual’s hours worked ( h ), divided by 458
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, the QLFS does not contain information on income and hence estimates for 2008 could not 
be included in this analysis.  
.  
7 Information on the number of covered workers by magisterial district from the 2000 Income Expenditure 
Survey (IES) of StatsSA was also used in the mapping process.  
8 The reported ‘hours worked’ variable is truncated at 84 hours to avoid a situation where this adjustment 
leads to very high minimum wages for people who work very long hours. This implies truncation at or 
around the 98th or 99th percentile of the ‘hours worked’ variable.  
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III. Results 
 
As a point of departure, a graphical approach is used to investigate the distribution of 
wages around the stipulated minima across the nine sectoral determinations.  Kernel 
density plots9
 
 are presented below for 2007 of the log of monthly wages for each of the 
different sectoral determinations.  The vertical line represents the natural logarithm of the 
mean adjusted monthly minimum wage in 2007.  Under full compliance one would 
expect no wages of workers covered by the respective sectoral determinations to lie 
below the vertical line, causing a single ‘spike’ at this point in the wage distribution. 
However, as the basic visual evidence provided in Figure 1 below would seem to suggest, 
significant spiking at the respective minima is not evident for many of the sector-
occupation-area cells under review here.  Put differently, this is initial evidence of 
relatively weak enforcement of sectoral minimum wage laws in South Africa.  
 
  
                                                 
9 The kernel density function approximates the probability density function f(x) from observations on a random variable
. The Kernel density approximation of an independently and identically distributed random sample (x1,x2,...xn) may be 
expressed by the following equation:  
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where the function , which determines the weights, is named the “kernel,” and h is a smoothing parameter known as 
the ‘bandwidth’ (Maloney & Nuñez, 2003). 
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of wages, 2007 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral 
determinations. 
 
Notes:  The vertical line represents the mean minimum wage (logged) in 2007.  
 
As the kernel density estimates of the wage distributions presented above seem to 
suggest, there is a problem of low enforcement of minimum wages in South Africa, with 
large proportions of workers in some sectors earning sub-minimum wages.  We now 
attempt to use a more numerical approach in order to measure the lack of enforcement of 
minimum wage legislation in the South African labour market.  We use a family of 
violation indices introduced in Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2010a), which has the 
following form: 
 
( )[ ]{ }αmma wwwEV /−=    
 
where w denotes wage, mw denotes the relevant minimum wage, α is an index that 
emphasizes concern on the depth of violation, and E is the expectation operator with 
respect to the wage distribution in the sector to which mw applies.  This family is 
analogous to the family of poverty indices introduced by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984).  When α = 0, the index collapses to the standard measure of violation—the 
percentage of covered workers earning sub-minimum wages.  When α = 1, the index 
captures the depth of violation.  As α increases, more and more weight is put on larger 
violations.  We use α = 2 to capture this perspective, referring to this measure as the 
severity of violation.   
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Below we present estimates of aV  in an attempt at being more rigorous in our measure of 
compliance with these sectoral minima by employers in South Africa.  Using the LFS for 
September 2007 then, V0 represents the fraction of individuals earning below the 
minimum, that is, when 0=a . V1, as noted above, provides a measure of how far below 
the minima an individual earns, and is a measure of the extent and depth of violation (or 
lack of compliance) amongst South African employers.  Increasing the value of the 
parameter a to 2 yields V2, the squared wage gap, and this serves, as noted above, as a 
measure of the severity of violation.  
 
Below reports estimates of V0, along with the ratio of V1 to V0 for 2007.  Whilst  V0 
measures the percentage of workers violated, that is, earning below the minimum, the 
ratio (V1/V0) allows for the interpretation of V1, since it denotes the percentage shortfall of 
the average wage of violated workers from the minimum wage.  Put differently, violated 
workers in this sample are earning on average (V1/V0) below the relevant minima.  
 
The estimates in the last row of Table 1 show that in South Africa V0 was 45 % in 2007. 
This means that in 2007, 45 % of employees were violated and receiving sub-minimum 
wages.  The estimate for V1 was 0.16 in 2007, whilst the ratio (V1/V0) was 0.36, indicating 
that non-complying employers paid wages that were on average 36 percent short of the 
legislative minima in that year.  
 
The headline result here is that absolute levels of violation in South Africa are 
disturbingly high, both in terms of the percentage of individuals violated as well as the 
distance of the wages of these individuals from the minima.  Indeed, in some sectors, V0 
soars to over 65 %, a deeply worrying result.  The high estimates for V0 are reflective of a 
significant number of employers in South Africa who are violating minimum wage laws 
across all sectoral determinations.  Violation rates vary from a low of 9 % in the Civil 
engineering sector to a high of 67 % among Security workers.  
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Table 1:  Estimates of violation in South Africa, 2007 
 
Sectoral Determination V0 V1 V2 V1/V0 
Retail Sector     
Managers Area A 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.25 
Managers Area B 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.38 
Managers Area C 0.36 0.14 0.06 0.39 
Clerks Area A 0.42 0.15 0.08 0.36 
Clerks Area B 0.56 0.22 0.12 0.39 
Clerks Area C 0.56 0.25 0.14 0.45 
Sales Assistant Area A 0.26 0.11 0.06 0.42 
Sales Assistant Area B 0.51 0.31 0.21 0.61 
Sales Assistant Area C 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.81 
Shop Assistant Area A 0.41 0.10 0.04 0.24 
Shop Assistant Area B 0.53 0.22 0.12 0.42 
Shop Assistant Area C 0.54 0.23 0.13 0.43 
Drivers Area A 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.24 
Drivers Area B 0.49 0.15 0.07 0.31 
Drivers Area C 0.23 0.11 0.06 0.48 
Forklift operators Area A 0.65 0.15 0.04 0.23 
Total Retail Sector 0.39 0.14 0.07 0.36 
Domestic workers     
Area A 0.31 0.09 0.04 0.29 
Area B & C 0.51 0.19 0.10 0.37 
Total Domestic Workers 0.39 0.13 0.06 0.33 
Farm Workers     
Area A 0.41 0.10 0.04 0.24 
Area B & C 0.65 0.21 0.10 0.32 
Total Farm Workers 0.55 0.17 0.07 0.31 
Forestry Workers 0.53 0.16 0.07 0.30 
Taxi workers     
Taxi operators Drivers 0.45 0.18 0.09 0.40 
Taxi operators Fare collector 0.64 0.24 0.14 0.38 
Total Taxi operators 0.47 0.18 0.09 0.38 
Security Workers     
Area 1 0.69 0.29 0.15 0.42 
Area 2 0.50 0.23 0.14 0.46 
Area 3 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.80 
Area 4 0.63 0.25 0.12 0.40 
Area 5 0.67 0.28 0.14 0.42 
Total Security workers 0.67 0.28 0.14 0.42 
Hospitality Workers     
Hospitality small firms 0.37 0.16 0.09 0.43 
Hospitality med-large firms 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.32 
Total Hospitality Workers 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.34 
Contract cleaners     
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Area 1 0.50 0.17 0.09 0.34 
Area 2 0.52 0.19 0.10 0.37 
Area 3 0.35 0.13 0.07 0.37 
Total Contract cleaners 0.44 0.16 0.08 0.36 
Civil engineering  0.09 0.04 0.02 0.44 
Total 0.45 0.16 0.08 0.36 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral 
determinations.   
 
Interestingly, the occupations regarded as possibly the two lowest paid in the South 
African economy, namely farm workers and household domestic workers, yield 
differential outcomes for compliance with minimum wage laws.  In the latter case the 
share below the minima, at 39.9 %, is in fact below the national average.  In contrast, the 
estimate for farm workers is significantly higher, as 55 % of all these workers earn below 
the minimum wage.  In addition, our V1 estimates show a similar discrepancy.  
Interestingly though, the average distance below the minimum wage, despite the share 
difference, is very similar in both these occupations.  
 
The Civil engineering results are indicative also of the importance and relevance of 
measuring not only the share of individual workers below a stipulated minimum (V0) but 
also the depth of this violation (V1).  Hence, whilst the share of these workers below the 
sector minimum is the lowest in the sample of covered workers, those below the 
minimum were in fact relatively the worst off:  violated Civil engineering employees 
were 44 % below the stipulated minimum, the highest within the sample.  This result in 
particular, illustrates the importance and policy relevance of this integrated measure of 
violation.  It suggests that when measuring minimum wage enforcement in any individual 
country setting, it is both the share below the minima and the distance below the minima 
of the violated, which is critical for understanding the impact of minimum wage policy in 
an economy. 
 
Finally, consider the measure V2 which squares the depth of violation before aggregating 
across violated workers.  The absolute numerical value of V2 does not have a meaning, 
but its ranking across sectors interesting.  Looking across the 9 sectors, while the sectors 
with the highest and lowest values of V1 and V2 are the same, the ranks are different, for 
example, for Forestry Workers or Contract Cleaners.  On the depth of violation (V1) 
Forestry Workers rank higher, but on severity of violation (V2) the ranks are reversed.  
And the answer is different yet again for the V0 measure.  Thus the overall degree of 
violation is high in South Africa, but the nature of the violation—level, depth, severity—
varies across sectors. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The results in this paper are an important value-added to previous research on 
enforcement of minimum wages in developing countries, and constitute, as far as the 
authors are aware, the first attempt to empirically estimate the effect of government 
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enforcement on compliance with minimum wage legislation in South Africa for its 
various sectors.  Analysis of the minimum wage regulatory environment in South Africa, 
as measured by the level, depth and severity of violation of minimum wages (violation 
indices V0, V1, and V2 respectively), reveals that non-compliance levels of employers in 
the country with minimum wages are disturbingly high, with the overall level of violation 
reaching nearly 50 percent in 2007.  Non-compliance is highest within the Security 
sector, with worryingly high estimates reaching 80 % in some areas in 2007, followed by 
the farm and forestry sectors (55 percent and 53 percent respectively).  Furthermore, 
occupation as well as the location of employment matters in the level and depth of 
violation observed.  These quantifications should provide a more solid basis for the South 
African debate on levels and enforcement of minimum wages. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1:  Sectoral Determinations in South Africa  
 
  
Sectoral 
Determination  
Occupation Area Types  Hours 
per week 
Firm size  
Farm workers N/A A and B N/A N/A 
Domestic workers N/A A and B > 27 hours N/A 
   < 27 hours N/A 
Farm workers N/A A and B N/A N/A 
Taxi workers Driver N/A N/A N/A 
 Fare Collector N/A N/A N/A 
Private Security N/A A, B, C, D, 
and E 
N/A N/A 
Retail Sector workers Managers A, B, and C N/A N/A 
 Clerks A, B, and C N/A N/A 
 Sales Workers  A, B, and C N/A N/A 
 Shop Assistants A, B, and C N/A N/A 
 Drivers A, B, and C N/A N/A 
 Forklift Operators A, B, and C N/A N/A 
 Security  A, B, and C N/A N/A 
Contract Cleaners N/A 1, 2 and 3 N/A N/A 
Forestry workers N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hospitality workers N/A N/A N/A Small (<10 employees) 
    Large (>10 employees) 
Civil Engineers N/A A and B N/A N/A 
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Appendix 2: Sectoral determinations and adjusted minima  
     
Sectoral 
determination 
Year 
published 
 Area Type Adjusted 
minima 2007 
Farm Workers 2002 A  1,041.00 
B  989.00 
Domestic 
Workers 
2002 A  >27 hrs 1,066.83 
<27hrs 865.54 
B >27 hrs 756.09 
<27hrs 613.39 
Private Security 2001 A  2,420.98 
B  2,217.73 
C  2,007.10 
D  1,869.41 
E  1,676.82 
Taxi 2005 Drivers  1,493.37 
Taxi fare collector/other 1,045.37 
Retail 2002 Managers A  3,908.38 
B  3,125.02 
C  2,968.77 
Clerks A  2,465.58 
B  1,990.52 
C  1,890.99 
Sales A  2,465.58 
B  1,990.52 
C  1,890.99 
Shop 
Assistant 
A  1,951.04 
B  1,573.01 
C  1,494.36 
Driver A  1,879.63 
B  1,491.11 
C  1,416.55 
Forklift 
operator 
A  1,770.43 
B  1,402.90 
C  1,332.76 
Security A  1,663.32 
B  1,583.51 
C  1,504.34 
Contract Cleaner 1999 A  1,805.70 
B  1,805.70 
C  1,443.00 
Forestry 2006   908.73 
Hospitality 2007 Small firms (<10 employees) 1,345.32 
Large firms (>10 employees) 1,499.85 
Civil Engineering 2001 A  2,162.55 
B  2,002.65 
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